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C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 000361

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/CBM, EAP/ANP

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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [AS](#) [MTCRE](#)

SUBJECT: MTCR: AUSTRALIA AGREES WITH USG'S SMALL GROUP PROPOSALS

REF: A. STATE 31851

[1](#)B. CANBERRA 354

Classified By: POLCOUNS WOO LEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D).

[1](#)1. (C) We presented ref A points on February 24 to Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Counterproliferation Section Director Peter Sawczak, soliciting Australian views on the three USG proposals for the April 4 Small Group meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and asking whether the GOA had any proposals of its own. Sawczak said his office had been considering some ideas, but he liked all three U.S. proposals and agreed that those would be enough for the Small Group countries to manage. He thought that ideas "A" (to pay special scrutiny to North Korean-flagged or destined vessels) and "B" (to scrutinize end-user requests for shipments transiting through key proliferation hubs like Singapore, Thailand and the UAE), would best be sponsored by either Australia or Japan. He also saw a strong need for MTCR countries to give briefings on their industries' in-house compliance programs to non-partner countries, as described in proposal "C".

[1](#)2. (C) Sawczak noted that Australia was already engaged in transshipment outreach similar to the "B" proposal for CW and BW-related items controlled under the Australia Group regime, so it would be a comfortable issue for the GOA to endorse under the MTCR. However, he also saw merit in the GOA doing more to pressure the DPRK (ref B) and indicated a willingness to discuss these proposals with Japanese counterparts. Sawczak strongly endorsed the Small Group mechanism as a way to build -- or if necessary, get around -- the consensus necessary within the MTCR regime. He supported the U.S. approach of pursuing two or three initiatives of "tangible, practical counterproliferation benefit" that were fairly apolitical, although he mentioned that South Africa might balk at "naming the name" of North Korea.  
STANTON